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ABSTRACT 
 
The main purpose of the paper is to analyze 
different channels for innovations. We analyze the 
influence of various incentives for innovation in 
Russian companies taking into account the 
organization of industries — vertical or horizontal 
orientation, peculiarities of corporate 
demography, role and motives of different owners 
(including government and foreign investors), 
demand trends, customers‘ profile, nature and 
intensity of competition in relevant markets. 
An empirical base for our study is 
provided by two surveys of Russian industrial 
companies conducted in 2011 and 2012. 
One of our hypotheses: in vertically 
organized sectors that define innovation 
activeness in the economy (for example, 
mechanical engineering), the innovative 
development of the head producers is constrained 
by the risk of technological gap with its partners 
in the supply chain. 
We find out that innovations in Russian 
industry spread in accordance with two main 
models: vertical through corporate connections, 
and horizontal, based on the example of foreign 
companies in the atmosphere of developed 
competition. 
 
Key Words —innovation, industrial organization, 
supply chain. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Innovations nowadays are widely recognized as a 
result of cooperation between a company and a 
number of outside entities. Studying of the 
environment in which the company operates and 
the characteristics of its interaction with partners, 
competitors, and government is a step towards a 
more complete and comprehensive understanding 
of patterns of innovative behavior.  
At the micro level, each innovative 
company solves this issue: what kind of 
knowledge and technology it should develop by 
itself, and which to outsource, ranging from 
covering only one link in a chain to companies of 
full cycle (vertically integrated). Participation in a 
production chain permits to share responsibility 
and risks, provides mutual support and also 
facilitates the transfer of skills and technology 
between the "links" companies [7]. The reverse 
side of the coin is an increase of costs due to a 
transactional component and a loss of a degree of 
freedom. The doctrine of "core competence" 
means that firms that outsource complementary 
competencies are more successful than the 
vertically integrated companies [19]. Sets of such 
solutions make the so-called value chains. 
According to the theory described in the paper [9], 
three basic parameters (complexity of knowledge 
transacted, the extent of codifying that knowledge 
and the capabilities of suppliers) define the model 
of the chain. The models differ in the way of 
knowledge transmission – voluntary or under 
pressure, formal (through standards and 
regulations) or face-to-face, direct (between two 
adjacent chain links) or group (for network and 
cluster associations). The nature of the product 
has also an impact on the nature of the interaction 
within the chains. For example, the production of 
unique innovative products (specific assets) is 
associated with increased transactional 
"coordination" costs, which makes the 
cooperation in the chain less attractive.  
The supply-chain relationships thus 
represent the issue of special importance 
explaining why, when, and how companies decide 
to innovate. The decision-making process is 
complicated: besides companies' internal 
managerial strategies and the level of trust 
between partners, few external factors also 
influence the buyer-supplier relationships 
including tacitness of technology, stability of 
demand, the level of competitive pressure and 
network connections both within and across 
industries [22]. 
In case of developing countries, special 
attention must be given to the participation of 
foreign companies in vertically related markets, as 
they are usually a source of vertical spillovers. 
Knowledge and technology in developing 
countries are mostly imported from more 
developed ones. Integration into the global market 
in theory should benefit national economy 
regardless of whether a domestic company buys or 
sells to the foreign one [4][8][12].  
In the paper we focus on analyzing the 
mechanisms of different incentives for innovation 
in the companies taking into account industrial 
organization – vertical or horizontal orientation, 
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peculiarities of corporate demography, demand 
and supply patterns and the role of competition on 
relevant markets.  
 
2. BACKGROUND AND 
PROPOSITIONS 
A number of channels to stimulate innovation 
have been described in the literature. Incentives to 
innovate could born inside a company but 
sometimes come from the outside, defined by the 
interaction with different agents of the innovation 
system. The vertical channel is highlighted, when 
innovations spread by communication with the 
chain partners, both backward (i. e. under the 
influence of suppliers [3][22]) and forward (in 
response to the changing consumer demand) [13]. 
In addition the company is also influenced by 
horizontal incentives through the example of 
competitors, partners in joint ventures or external 
experts [11]. Some researchers have considered 
separately the channel of communication with 
public organizations and universities [21].  
Here are our main hypotheses and 
propositions about the nature of the influence of 
various innovative incentives.  
 
Proposition 1. Horizontal channels of 
innovation are more characteristic of large 
companies operating in developed competitive 
environment.  
As for the horizontal channel and the impact of 
competition, the dependence of innovative 
activities on the intensity of competition is of 
complex nature. It has been theoretically proven 
that in case the level of competition is too high it 
hinders the implementation of innovations 
[17][25]. Relationship between competition and 
corporate commitment to innovation can be 
visualized as a reverse U-shaped curve [1][14][24]. 
In case the level of competition is low, the 
company lacks stimuli, and if it is high, corporate 
resources are limited due to competition. However, 
in Russia the level of competition is far from the 
upper part of the curve. Empiric researches led us 
to the conclusion that in the majority of industries 
(at least as of early and middle 2000th) the level 
of competition was not high enough to play a 
negative role [16][28].  
In a developed competitive environment, 
companies are sensitive to the achievements of 
competitors, keenly interested in gaining 
competitive advantage, and therefore they are 
open to modernization and learning new 
technologies. Receptivity of big business to the 
competitors’ best practice is noted in numerous 
studies [5][6][26]. We assume that big business 
has sufficient resources for systematic market 
monitoring for advanced technologies and has 
more "receptors" to search for innovation supply 
in the market.  
 
Proposition 2. Vertical channels of innovation 
are significant in Russian industry, especially 
in the sectors with weak competitive 
environment and with significant asymmetry of 
counterparties' market power.  
The level of trust in vertical alliances is 
significantly higher than in the horizontal [20]. 
Under conditions of inefficient institutions and 
high uncertainty, and therefore weak coordination 
mechanisms, these matters a lot for the formation 
of market structure. In vertically organized 
industries there are more mechanisms for 
monitoring and control, more possibilities to force 
counterparties to fulfill contractual obligations. So 
we assume that in weak institutional infrastructure 
knowledge and technology are mainly transferred 
through vertical channels. Whereas horizontal 
spillovers can either increase or decrease the 
innovative activity and well-being of agents, 
depending on various external factors, vertical 
spillovers always have a positive effect [2].  
It should be noted that companies in 
production chains have different bargaining power 
(that is called "the asymmetry of market power"). 
For example, the monopolistic position in the 
market or, for example, possession of a special, 
inimitable knowledge, increases the weight of the 
company in the chain. On the other hand, the 
number of buyers is also significant: the fewer 
they are, the better their bargaining power is. The 
presence of strong imbalances in the economy, 
including monopolies of either sellers or buyers, 
promotes appearance of vertical chains with 
strong leaders.  
If the institutional structure is not mature 
enough, the networks of subcontracting are 
underdeveloped, and trade barriers are numerous, 
especially in the decentralized sectors of the 
economy, the horizontal inter-firm cooperation is 
difficult [18]. Lack of competitive pressure 
weakens typically more "soft" horizontal stimuli. 
4 
 
In this sense, the “vertical integration” process can 
be seen as a natural response to the ineffectiveness 
of institutions and low culture of contractual 
relationships.  
 
Proposition 3. In vertically organized sectors 
with innovation potential (for example, 
mechanical engineering), the innovative 
development of the leaders is constrained by 
the risk of technological gap with their 
partners in the supply chain.  
The interaction between the partners in the 
production chain has a significant potential of 
generation of innovation and its distribution. Thus, 
some researchers show that in Russia the greatest 
impact on firms’ selection of more "advanced" 
innovation models is made by collaboration with 
consumers in the development of innovation. 
However, if there exist rigid (i. e. not adjusted to 
the rapid reorientation to other counterparties) 
industrial relations between the supplier and the 
consumer, then the innovation inertia of the first 
holds back the development of the second.  
 
Proposition 4. For exporting companies a 
significant incentive to innovate is the 
tightening of the requirements of technical 
regulations and standards.  
The possibility of codifying production norms and 
traditions is one of the conditions for 
"understanding", that is, for effective coordination 
between the partners in the supply chain 
[9][10][18]. Technical regulations and standards 
are designed to reduce uncertainty and 
information asymmetries, enhance the level of 
confidence between agents and thereby reduce 
transaction costs [27]. The adoption of technical 
standards also alleviates the problem of the gap in 
the level of technology with suppliers that Gereffi 
et al. considered as a major obstacle to the 
implementation of joint projects and 
collaborations.  
At the same time, additional difficulties 
arise when firms from developing countries enter 
global value chains, as they often do not meet the 
requirements of partners from more developed 
countries [15]. In particular, widely known are the 
differences between Russian and European 
technical regulations that create barriers to 
successful export of Russian goods to foreign 
countries [23]. Discrepancy in standards forces the 
foreign buyers to use additional mechanisms to 
monitor and control the quality of products, and 
thus to bear the additional costs. In this regard, it 
can be assumed that the tightening of domestic 
regulations and standards reduces the gap between 
countries and allows exporting companies enter 
foreign markets less painfully.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
The empirical base of the research was formed as 
a result of two questionnaire surveys of Russian 
industrial enterprises, conducted in September and 
October 2011 and August-September 2012. In the 
first case the sample included 602 companies, in 
the second – 652 companies, representing mainly 
the manufacturing industry (Appendix Table I). 
The panel formed by the results of two surveys 
consists of 415 companies.  
Organizations were asked about the main 
incentives for the implementation of technological 
innovations. Stimuli of different nature were 
presented among the options:  
        Market demand and the example of other 
companies; 
       Diffusion of innovation in value added 
chains; 
          Technical regulation; 
          Innovation supply. 
The frequency of the incentives is 
presented in Table 1. The most popular options 
are examples of leading companies (equally 
Russian and foreign), as well as demand for the 
products, both from major customers in the value 
added chains and from the final consumers 
(households). 
 In this paper we propose the following 
classification of incentives:  
(1) by the "direction" of the impact  
– vertical, connected to technological changes in 
the main suppliers and (or) consumers. Such 
incentives are expected to be of importance for 
vertically organized sectors;  
– horizontal, determined by the examples of other 
companies. These incentives seem to be detected 
on horizontally organized sectors that are open for 
competition with foreign companies;  
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Table 2. Classification of incentives for technological innovation  
  External channels / incentives for 
innovation at the firm level  
Percentage of 
companies 
Horizontal / 
vertical  
Diffusion / 
enforcement  
Public policy / 
environment  
Market demand and the best example of other companies 
1.  Examples of leading foreign 
companies  
30%  Horizontal  Diffusion  Environment  
2.  Examples of leading Russian 
companies  
30%  Horizontal  Diffusion  Environment  
3.  Changes in consumer demand  27%  Horizontal  Diffusion, 
enforcement  
Environment  
Diffusion of innovation in supply chains 
4.  Transition of the main users to new 
products and technologies, tightening 
their requirements for suppliers 
35%  Vertical  Enforcement, 
diffusion  
Environment  
5.  Transition of the main suppliers to 
production of materials (or 
components) with new properties, 
creating new innovation opportunities 
for their users  
18%  Vertical  Diffusion, 
enforcement  
Environment  
Technical regulation 
6.  Development of standards and 
tightening of the technical regulations  
22%  Horizontal / 
Vertical  
Enforcement  Public policy, 
environment  
7.  Tightening of the technical 
requirements for products in the public 
procurement  
4%  Vertical / 
Horizontal  
Enforcement Public policy  
Innovation supply 
8.  R&D of research institutes 11%  Horizontal  Diffusion  Environment, 
public policy  
9.  R&D of universities  1%  Horizontal  Diffusion  Environment, 
public policy  
10.  Recommendations (including 
informal) of public authorities  
3%  Vertical  Enforcement, 
diffusion  
Public policy  
11.  Proposals from external consultants 
and experts  
7%  Horizontal  Diffusion  Environment  
 
(2) by the “rigidity” of the impact  
– diffusion, when the company is receptive to new 
knowledge and technologies and either receives 
them as spillover effects or finds interesting 
solutions on the market on its own;  
– enforcement, when the company is forced to 
move to a new technology by its partners in the 
supply chain or the regulator;  
(3) by the source of the impact 
– public policy, when the changes are caused by 
the actions of the state, either direct or indirect 
(through stimulating the innovation technologies’ 
supply by universities and research organizations);  
– environment, when the innovations are caused 
by changes in market conditions.  
 
The data was processed with factor analysis in 
order to emphasize some basic innovation 
channels. Factor analysis was followed by 
regression analysis, which was aimed to connect 
these basic models with firms’ characteristics and 
peculiarities of industrial organization. 
 
4. RESULTS 
General analysis of the prevalence of various 
channels to distribute and to stimulate innovation 
has shown that there are significant imbalances:  
(1) among horizontal channels – the low 
significance of innovation supply channels (a 
consequence of the low receptivity of companies 
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and their focus on imitating and adapting existing 
technologies). The role of universities in the 
innovation supply channels is very low (a low 
level of integration of science and education);  
(2) among vertical channels – the essential 
role of the transfer of “modernization shifts” from 
the bottom of the supply chains (a consequence of 
the dependence on suppliers because of their 
uniqueness and codification expenses of changing 
a supplier).  
(3)  small public demand for innovation 
(though the state is widely involved in the 
economy through public procurement system, as 
for 10% of the sample enterprises the state is the 
major buyer).  
Note that there is a relation between the 
importance of various innovation channels and the 
duration of the innovation activities carried out by 
the companies:  
–   for companies that began innovation in the last 
3 years, the example of leading Russian 
companies and the tightening of technical 
regulation are of great significance;  
–  for companies that have been implementing 
innovation for a long time, the example of foreign 
companies and the perspective developments of  
Russian research organizations are of great 
significance. This could be regarded as a 
consequence of the accumulation of practices and 
knowledge, and, therefore, their wider horizontal 
"mental outlook".  
The obtained empirical results indicate that 
the role of various incentives for companies’ 
innovation is largely dependent on industrial 
organization, the place which the company 
occupies in the supply chain, exports etc. The 
systematic analysis of the innovation channels let 
us identify the following regularities, sometimes 
obvious and sometimes not:  
– the example of leading companies, both foreign 
and Russian, as an incentive to innovation is more 
common for companies operating in developed 
competitive environment;  
– the tightening of the requirements of technical 
regulations and standards as an incentive of 
innovation is more characteristic of exporting 
companies which have recently started to 
innovate;  
– the integration of the company is positively 
related to the diffusion of innovation upstream by 
cooperation chain and horizontally from research 
organizations.  
The significance of different channels and 
incentives for innovation varies substantially 
depending on the place of the company in a 
cooperation chain:  
–examples of Russian companies is more 
significant for firms supplying raw materials, 
while the producers of products with a higher 
degree of processing apprehend mostly the 
example of leading foreign companies;  
– the tightening of the requirements of technical 
regulations and standards has a bigger impact on 
the innovation activity of producers of final goods.  
We now proceed from the analysis of 
individual relations to distinguishing some basic 
models of the innovative channels at the firm level. 
Basing on factor analysis and taking into account 
the significance (prevalence) of various incentives 
to innovation among the companies in the sample, 
we can select two basic models related to the first 
and the third factors (Table 2):  
1. The first model of companies’ incentives to 
innovate is determined by the example of 
the leading companies, both Russian and 
foreign, as well as the changes on the 
market (for example, due to changes in the 
preferences of the population). This model 
is close to the well-known "demand-driven 
innovation" or the "user-driven innovation";  
2. The second model is related to the 
technological modernization and 
development of capabilities of suppliers, as 
well as to possible applications of 
perspective R&D of Russian research 
organizations. This model can be attributed 
to the "supply-driven innovation".  
Both models include horizontal and vertical 
innovation channels and enforcement mechanisms 
as well as diffusion, but there is a fundamental 
difference: the first model ("pull") is associated 
with a certain following of the firms in their 
innovation to the market, to the competitors and 
so on, and the second ("push") – with the 
implementation of innovations that is based on 
new scientific and technological and cooperative 
opportunities of the firm. Usually the "pull" model 
is connected with proactive scientific and 
technological policy of the state, although the 
state can also contribute in the "push" model using 
the mechanism of public procurement. 
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Table 2. Factor analysis 
Incentives for technological innovation  
Factors 
1  2  3  4  
Examples of leading foreign companies   .674 .268  .064  -.036  
Examples of leading Russian companies  .620 .073  -.053  .189  
Changes in consumer demand  .495 -.130  -.048  -.341  
Transition of the main users to new products and technologies, 
tightening their requirements for suppliers 
.547 -.290  .182  .154  
Transition of the main suppliers to production of materials (or 
components) with new properties, creating new innovation 
opportunities for their users  
-.013  -.164  .787 -.019  
Development of standards and tightening of the technical 
regulations  
.353  .069  -.034  .596 
Tightening of the technical requirements for products in the 
public procurement  
.018  .173  .505 .430  
R&D of research institutes .147  .408  .517 -.253  
R&D of universities  -.074  .648 .138  .065  
Recommendations (including informal) of public authorities  -.048  -.076  -.014  .646 
Proposals from external consultants and experts  .105  .697 -.137  .002  
Comparing the selected models of 
innovation incentives of the 2012 survey with the 
results of 2011 one, we can see that the picture 
changed significantly: there is a stronger 
aggregation of vertical and horizontal channels of 
influence on the company, as well as combining 
of enforcement and diffusion. In our opinion, this 
may be related to the dynamic and intense process 
of increasing sensitivity of Russian companies to 
best practices and knowledge in the post-crisis 
period.  
Let's consider the question of how the 
selected models are related to the characteristics 
of the companies, their position in the supply 
chain and the specifics of industrial organization.  
Comparing the results of linear regression 
analysis of the first and the third factors, we got 
the following results:  
1. Companies following the first model of 
innovation, as a rule, face strong 
competition both from overseas and from 
Russian producers. These are mostly 
producers of intermediate goods and 
consumer goods, not integrated and 
therefore more receptive to the horizontal 
market signals such as the experience and 
practices of other companies.  
2. As is well known, the possibilities of 
perception and adaptation of technologies 
are positively related to the scale of the 
business, and to its export orientation. 
Within the analyzed sample, we see the 
similar result – the first model of innovation 
is more common for large companies with 
more than 1,000 employees, as well as for 
companies exporting to far-abroad countries.  
3. The first model is close to adaptative 
approach to innovation: firms follow their 
competitors and market trends. Thus, in this 
model, it is a catching-up development, 
compounded by a weak receptivity to the 
results of research and development. 
4. A group of companies following the second 
model is distinct by their vertical integration. 
This determines their stronger response to 
the channels of "innovation supply" 
(diffusion of innovation upstream the 
production chain or from research 
organizations). It is important that these 
companies are often relatively old, have the 
state among shareholders, focused primarily 
on sales to the state, and traditionally 
engaged in innovation and R&D funding. 
These companies are usually placed in a 
less fierce competition. 
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Table 3. Characteristics of firms following two main models 
  1. Best practice and market pull 
(examples of other companies and 
changes in market demand) 
3. Innovation supply and push 
(diffusion of innovative changes 
upstream the supply chain and from 
research organizations) 
The scale of the 
business  
+ large companies (more than 1,000 
employees) 
 
Age   + "old" companies (over 20 years) 
Ownership   + state participation 
Integration  + vertical 
Type of main products  + intermediate goods and consumer 
goods 
 
The main consumer  - state + state 
Level of competition  + high - high 
Export + to far-abroad countries  
R&D expenses  +  
The novelty of 
innovative products  
+ new for the enterprise, Russia end 
world 
+ new for enterprise and Russia 
 
Thus, the first model is more oriented to 
the market, but its companies are not yet receptive 
enough to innovative proposal and they are more 
concentrated on imitating existing technologies. 
The second model continues to some extent the 
tradition of the Soviet planned economy in those 
sectors which, because of various reasons, were 
strategic to the state. Through the holdings and the 
influence on the public research organizations the 
state is trying to solve the problem of proactive 
modernization in sectors with underdeveloped 
competition and to maintain global 
competitiveness of certain sectors of the economy.  
The results suggest that our hypotheses 
were confirmed only partially. Moreover, some 
results seem surprising, and we will give them 
additional explanation.  
First. We assumed the essential role of 
vertical channels (which was confirmed), but we 
thought that their influence will be more negative 
(but actually found the opposite).  
Therefore, let's consider in some detail the 
question of what determines the firms’ choice 
between the following, in general, mutually 
exclusive statements:  
(1) one of the external obstacles to innovation in 
the enterprise is that the introduction of new 
technologies will result in appearance (or 
increase) of the technological gap with partners in 
the supply chain;  
 
 
(2) the transition of suppliers of the enterprise to 
producing materials and components with new 
properties has been an incentive for technological 
innovation in the enterprise over the past three 
years.  
Our regression analysis showed that the 
first statement (negative) appears to be fair to the 
companies that are relatively young, in fierce 
competition with other Russian companies, and 
focused on the sales to households. The second 
(positive) one is typical of old companies, 
integrated firms, and ones focused on the state. 
Thus, the choice of positive statement is to a large 
extent due to vertical integration, which promotes 
coordination of the companies in the cooperation 
chain and technological planning.  
Second. The Russian government seeks to 
make public procurement more innovative and to 
strengthen the state's role in stimulating demand 
for innovative products. However, the effect of 
public procurement for stimulation of innovation 
in the framework of the analyzed sample is very 
local. So let's again try to compare the 
characteristics of the two groups of companies 
who agree with one of the following statements:  
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(1) one of the external obstacles to innovation of 
the enterprise is the limited amount of public 
procurement of innovative products;  
(2) the tightening of the technical requirements of 
the public procurement has been an incentive to 
encourage technological innovation in the 
enterprise over the last three years.  
Our regression analysis showed that 
companies included in the vertical holdings have 
more optimistic view to public procurement 
(because the change in the requirements of the 
state is easier transformed into modernization 
plans for supply chain). However, a more 
important result, in our opinion, is that a 
mechanism of public procurement affects in, 
positively or negatively, the old companies to a 
greater extent. This defines its limited 
applicability as a driver of deep technological 
changes in the economy, of the formation of new 
sectors and, moreover, of the constant temptation 
for officials to use it not only for development, but 
also for the stabilization of the situation in 
individual, often inefficient enterprises.  
Third. We noted earlier the limited 
receptivity of Russian companies to the 
perspective R&D of Russian research 
organizations. Generally speaking, the problem 
may be somewhere in between and may be 
connected not only with predominantly imitative 
nature of innovation in companies, but also with 
the quality of innovation supply from the Russian 
research sector. The analysis showed that there are 
signs of a potential expansion of the interest of 
Russian companies in the medium term to 
interaction with foreign research organizations. 
This shift is often observed when the firms are 
competing with foreign firms, and are focused on 
the development and manufacture of globally new 
innovative products (not only new for the 
enterprise). So we can talk about the globalization 
of innovation demand of Russian companies not 
only for technologies but also for the results of 
research and development, as well as about the 
preconditions for international partnership in the 
research field.  
Fourth. We talked about how the position 
of the firms in cooperation chains impacts on 
innovation. On the basis of the analyzed sample of 
companies, we can see that Russian companies are 
focused on enhancing the processes of integration 
into global value chains in the medium term. It is 
important that regardless of the place of the 
enterprises in the cooperation chain there is a shift 
of their preferences concerning the directions of 
such integration to a more flexible and 
technology-intensive forms, in particular to the 
expansion of imports of technology, as well as to 
joint research with foreign companies.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Generally, we can see that innovations are mainly 
spread in accordance with two main models: 
vertical – through corporate connections, and 
horizontal – based on the example of both foreign 
and Russian companies in the atmosphere of 
developed competition.  
Incentives for innovation at the company 
level depend to a large extent on the 
characteristics of the industrial organization of the 
sector and on the company's position in the supply 
chain.  
The main incentive to innovate is 
competition, and its role is very significant not 
only in terms of pressure on the company, but also 
for horizontal dissemination of advanced 
technologies through the example of others. This 
learning effect is typical of larger companies and 
more noticeable when there is a competition with 
foreign companies (but not too strong), when the 
company has export to far abroad countries, as 
well as for larger companies. In the face of 
increasing competition, there are prerequisites to 
the globalization of innovation demand of Russian 
companies, not only for technology but also for 
the results of research and development.  
A significant and substantial factor of the 
impact of innovation signals to Russian 
companies is their involvement in vertical 
holdings. Historically holding forms of business 
organization spread widely in the Russian 
economy in the 90s, as some palliative response of 
the business to the challenges in contract 
discipline, ensuring control over the domestic 
prices in the value chain, reducing transaction 
costs. The government also shaped actively 
integrated companies using its stakes to 
consolidate the property and to reduce the burden 
on the administrative management system, as well 
as to coordinate changes and implementation of 
long-term development programs in specific 
sectors.  
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Vertical integration has a dual effect on 
company’s innovative behavior. Such companies 
are innovative enough, they innovate in a strategic 
way, but are much less susceptible and sensitive to 
external horizontal market signals.  
Two basic models of the incentives to 
innovate of Russian companies have been outlined 
in the paper. The first deals mainly with the 
horizontal diffusion of technologies through the 
example of other companies in competitive 
conditions. The second is based on the innovation 
supply (from the bottom of the cooperation chain 
and from research institutes) and is more typical 
of integrated, state-oriented  companies. The first 
model is more susceptible to changes and 
demands of the market, but it also defines a lower 
receptivity to the results of research and 
development.  
The second model originally emerged in 
sectors with underdeveloped subcontracting 
networks and weak standardization, where self-
regulation mechanisms do not work in due 
measure, and in a mixed economy. In this case a 
big failure appears in the coordination of 
innovation (technological) changes. This failure is 
compensated by vertical integration and 
participation of the state in coordinating changes. 
However, the situation, when the state acts 
simultaneously as the consumer, the regulator of 
the market, the customer of R&D and technology, 
and the direct owner of several companies, leads 
to the problem of the internal contradiction of the 
state’s role (as the purchaser, the regulator and the 
owner) and the risk of introducing significant 
distortions in the competitive environment and 
application of double standards.  
The significantly varying picture of the 
dependence of incentives and innovative channels 
on the industrial organization defines the high 
heterogeneity of the impact of different 
instruments to stimulate innovation in the 
economy on specific sectors and industries. In fact, 
basing on the analysis of innovation incentives at 
the micro level in the light of the value chains 
organization one can get quite a practical 
approach to link and combine innovation policy 
with industrial one.  
The innovation policy toolkit should be 
tailored to the industry specifics (vertical or 
horizontal, open or closed). The choice of the 
tools on overcoming barriers to innovation is 
better to be in sync with the market structure and 
the “profile” of different channels. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table I. Structure of samples  
  
Percentage of 
companies, % 
in the sample 
of 2011 
in the sample 
of 2012 
Age of company      
less than 5 years  9.0  10.7  
5-10 years  18.6  18.3  
10-20 years  24.6  25.3  
over 20 years  47.8  45.7  
Industry      
extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas  6.5  6.7  
manufacture of food products, including beverages  16.7  15.6  
manufacture of textiles and textile products  13.1  13.8  
manufacture of wood, wood products, pulp, paper and paper products  13.3  11.3  
manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  11.0  10.3  
manufacture of rubber and plastic products  7.6  6.7  
manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products  -  6.7  
manufacture of basic metals  8.1  7.5  
manufacture of machinery and equipment  9.1  8.0  
manufacture of electrical machinery and equipment  6.6  6.1  
manufacture of transport equipment  8.0  7.1  
Number of employees      
up to 250 employees 35.8  49.8  
251-500 employees 28.1  18.6  
501-1000 employees 18.8  15.8  
over 1,000 employees 17.3  15.8  
Annual revenue      
not more than 100 million rubles  19.4  20.9  
more than 100 million rubles, but not more than 500 million rubles  29.1  25.2  
more than 500 million rubles, no more than 1 billion rubles  20.6  19.0  
more than 1 billion rubles, but not more than 5 billion rubles  22.6  24.5  
more than 5 billion rubles  8.0  10.1  
Ownership      
participation of foreign owners  21.4  18.9  
participation of foreign owners more than 10% 15.3  13.8  
participation of government and / or municipalities  11.1  10.7  
Exporting      
to the former Soviet Union (FSU) countries  49.8  48.2  
to other countries  29.5  28.2  
Financial condition      
poor  14.5  11.0  
satisfactory  65.7  65.2  
good  19.8  23.3  
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Table II. Characteristics of firms following two main models of innovation channels – results of linear 
regression parameters estimation 
 
Best practice and market pull Innovation supply and push 
 
1.1 1.2 1.3 2.1 2.2 2.3 
Age_ Under 5 years ,035 ,198 ,171 -,183 -,183 -,172 
Age_ Over 20 years ,029 -,052 -,090 ,210** ,160* ,152* 
Number of employees_ Up to 100 people -,287** -,096 -,070 -,168 -,172 -,160 
Number of employees_ 101-250 people -,262** -,145 -,129 -,092 -,095 -,096 
Number of employees_ 501-1000 people ,111 ,044 -,054 ,002 -,084 -,128 
Number of employees_ Over 1,000 people ,451*** ,377*** ,241** -,040 -,092 -,154 
Government stske_Yes -,035 ,020 -,061 ,366*** ,217* ,224* 
Foreign owners stake_ No -,248 -,163 ,002 -,027 -,071 -,022 
Foreign owners stake_ More than 10% -,089 -,164 ,026 -,107 -,110 -,035 
Integration_Russian vertically integrated 
holding 
,112 ,078 ,022 ,524*** ,503*** ,472*** 
Integration_Multinational -,210 -,212 -,154 ,211 ,145 ,177 
Financial condition_ Poor  -,121 -,163 -,078 -,024 ,013 ,038 
Financial condition_ Good -,082 ,003 -,107 ,008 -,065 -,116 
Main product_Raw materials 
 
-,079 ,042 
 
,024 ,077 
Main product_Intermediate goods 
 
,307*** ,207** 
 
,079 ,048 
Main product_Capital goods 
 
,203 ,113 
 
,029 -,018 
Main product_Finall durable goods 
 
,244** ,115 
 
-,051 -,095 
Main product_Finall non-durable goods 
 
,273** ,243** 
 
,049 ,032 
Competition with Russian firms_ No 
 
-,094 ,053 
 
-,151 -,106 
Competition with Russian firms_ Tough 
 
,338*** ,288*** 
 
-,117 -,127 
Competition with foreign firms_ No 
 
-,027 -,070 
 
-,008 -,029 
Competition with foreign firms_ Tough 
 
,285*** ,175** 
 
-,160* -,201** 
Key customer_ Government 
 
-,226* -,201* 
 
,657*** ,607*** 
Key customer_ Households 
 
-,061 -,063 
 
-,054 -,030 
Exports_ No 
 
-,258** -,086 
 
-,012 ,070 
Exports_ To far abroad countries 
 
,296*** ,173* 
 
,179 ,114 
Spending on R&D_Yes 
  
,152* 
  
,068 
Innovative products_New for company     1,046***   
 
,325*** 
Innovative products_New for Russia 
  
,902*** 
  
,561*** 
Innovative products_New globally 
  
,691** 
  
,468 
Constant ,136 -,261 -,678 -,276 -,156 -,319 
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
N 646 646 643 646 646 643 
R
2
 ,136 ,245 ,460 ,147 ,197 ,235 
*     significant at 0,10 level 
**   significant at 0,05 level 
*** significant at 0,01 level 
 
 
